Uncomfortable Questions September 3, 2004 First, my prayers from Key West (Cayo Hueso) that there be no serious injury to property, to life, via Hurricane Frances. Second, as my website reveals, I am, among other things, a retired Army reservist who, in my last assignment, commanded the 309th Civil Affairs Group. Even in that retired capacity, I have remained active as a student and conferee at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. As such, I receive a monthly online newsletter from the College's Strategic Studies Institute. The September, 2004 newsletter contains an interesting, 2-page "op-ed" piece by Dr. Max G. Manwaring, entitled "Uncomfortable Questions Regarding the Inevitable Succession of Power in Cuba". The first question is "who will succeed the nearly 80-year old Fidel Castro when he dies?" Dr. Manwaring opines that the most likely scenario is that Fidel's brother, Raul, would succeed him. The second question is "what role will the Cuban armed forces play in the transition process?" Dr. Manwaring notes that the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [FAR]) "has long been the most powerful, influential, and competent governmental institution in Cuba" and he opines that "top generals will play crucial roles in all conceivable succession scenarios". Dr. Manwaring notes a couple of possible, alternative scenarios. If Raul Castro were to die before his older brother, the expected succession would be thrown into chaos. Alternatively, if there were large-scale internal popular violence - exacerbated by anti-regime forces outside Cuba - it is possible that some military commanders might refuse to move against civilians. In both these alternative scenarios, Manwaring notes three cumulatively possible developments: (a) "institutional integrity - military command and control - could be fractured and a certain level of anarchy would be encouraged; (b) "various individuals with viable political and/or military power at their disposal could and would challenge the system, and the best organized and best armed leader would dominate a praetorian-type regime"; and (c) "there is a high probability of civil war". The third question posed by Manwaring is "what should U.S. planners and leaders focus on that would be most helpful in proactively preparing for or reacting ad hoc to a situation involving the demise or incapacitation of either Fidel or Raul Castro?" Manwaring suggests that the answer is that the U.S. should be researching, monitoring and molding whether or not the institutional integrity of FAR is being enhanced or eroded; the U.S. should be determining the cohesion, singularity of purpose, professionalism, popular support of FAR's personnel, as well as the political and leadership skills of its officer corps. The U.S., per Manwaring, should be assessing all of the different variables which could prevent Cuba from becoming a failed state, and/or which could contribute to the establishment of a responsible democratic system in the country. Manwaring suggests that we are failing in those tasks. The final or fourth question is "what end-state planning should the U.S. be doing?" In response, Manwaring answers that we can not leave Cuba's many interrelated problems and how they be dealt with, to "ad-hoc-ery". Manwaring says "it is time to move beyond a unilateral, crisis management approach to the Cuban strategic problem as if it were a strategy. A long-term multilateral endgame strategy is required for Cuba in which the United States is a key player. If the United States is to protect and enhance its interests in Cuba and the Caribbean region it will be crucial to: (1) gather the information that explains the key operative variables in the Cuban situation; (2) determine mutually-agreed interests with other players; (3) establish an integrated multilateral implementing strategy upheld by transparent, achievable goals that can be used to evaluate progress; and (4) develop the multilateral organization that can implement a unified strategy. The sooner, the better." Whether one agrees with Dr. Manwaring's observations or not, I think all will pretty much agree that they are thought provoking. I think all will pretty much agree as well that Dr. Manwaring's suggestions might make more sense than mere embargoes and limited visits by relatives only once every 3 or 5 years, and no visits at all by U.S. non-relatives (not even for humanitarian purposes). Finally, as pretty much a personal matter, I would also observe that it is a tragedy that we didn't apply the Manwaring suggestions to the debacle in Iraq -- we can declare ill-planned, pre-emptive wars on a nation thousands of miles distant, but not on a nation 90 miles away.